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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationships between CEO compensation and 
firm level performance in the U.S. General Retail Store Sector. We performed cross sectional 
regressions on the entire sample and found no significant relationship existed between the level 
of CEO compensation and a set of independent variables that proxy for firm performance. We 
then performed a Stepwise regression and found that Market Capitalization and Gross Margin 
were significantly related to the level of CEO compensation and a set of independent variables 
that proxy firm performance. Our findings suggest that CEO compensation is positively related 
to market capitalization and gross profit margin. 
1. Introduction 
Since the great recession of 2007-2008 CEO compensation has drawn a great deal of 
attention and scrutiny from academics, regulators and the general public at large. However, most 
of the attention has focused on top executive compensation in the financial services sector. Many 
other industries have received less attention, most notably the U.S. Retailing Industry. This paper 
is an attempt to fill this void by empirically examining the relationship between CEO 
compensation and firm performance in the U.S. Department Store Industry.  
 In this study, we used for a sample of large General Merchandisers in the U.S. retrieved 
from Fortune Magazine list of the top 500 companies. We chose a single industry to control for 
firm heterogeneity (Chadwick, Hunter &Watson, 2004). Firms with similar operating 
characteristics may provide more reliable comparisons and better explain CEO compensation 
and firm performance (Crumley, 2006). 
 We develop cross sectional regression and stepwise regression models using variables 
that proxy for CEO compensation and firm performance. Stepwise regressions have been used in 
prior studies to examine the relationships between CEO pay and firm performance (Agarwal, 
1981; Jalbert, Jalbert, and Furumo, 2013).  We do this in order to determine whether a significant 
relationship exists between the level of CEO compensation and a set of variables proxies for firm 
performance for a sample of U.S. General Merchandise chains. Our results indicate that market 
capitalization and gross margin are significantly related to CEO compensation. 
The theoretical framework used in this study is agency theory. Agency theory suggests 
that there might be conflicts of interest between to executives who manage the firm and the 
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stockholders who own the firm. Managers may seek to maximize their own well-being at the 
expense of the shareholders. The conflict of interest may be mitigated if top executive 
compensation is significantly related to firm performance. The remainder of the paper is 
organized as follows. In section one, we present a brief review of literature and the theoretical 
background.  Section II discusses the hypotheses, data and methodology. Section III provides the 
empirical results,  
1. Theoretical background 
     In their seminal work Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) demonstrate that managers will pursue 
their own self interest when they do not own the entire of the firm. This self-interest behavior 
might cause the manager to behave in a manner that may cause harm to the firm in an attempt to 
increase their own compensation and other compensation related perks. Agency theory provides 
the theoretical framework for examining this important topic. Kim and Gu, (2005), argue that 
compensation based on managerial performance maybe better as opposed to monitoring the CEO 
because monitoring managerial performance maybe more efficient due to the expensive nature of 
monitoring.   One way to gain a better understanding of managerial compensation is to examine 
the relationship between CEO compensation and a set of specific firm variables that proxy 
performance. Many studies have been conducted examine this relationship in several industries. 
For example, Demirer and Yuan (2013), examine the relationship between executive 
compensation and firm performance in the restaurant industry.  They find that part of the 
problem associated with executive compensation and firm performance is due to separation of 
management from ownership. Kim and Gu (2005), examined the determinants of CEO cash 
compensation for 73 U.S. Restaurant firms in 2002. They found a significant relationship existed 
between CEO compensation and total assets and asset turnover. Brick, Palmon and Wald (2006) 
examined the relationship between CEO pay, director pay, firm characteristics, CEO 
characteristics, and governance variables. They found evidence that excessive CEO pay and 
director compensation were correlated with firm underperformance. Yet in a prior study, Deckop 
(1988) examined the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance and found 
that CEO’s were not given an incentive to increase the size of the firm at the expense of profits. 
In 2013, Nulla examined the relationship between CEO compensation, firm size, accounting firm 
performance and corporate governance from 2005 to 2010 for 25 companies randomly selected 
from the NYSE. Nulla (2013) found a positive relationship between CEO salary and bonus, total 
compensation, firm size, accounting performance, and corporate governance. In another study, 
Nulla (2013) examined the relationship between firm size and CEO compensation and found a 
significant relationship existed between firm size and CEO compensation. The literature is 
replete with studies that have examined CEO compensation and firm performance in many 
industries. But very few studies have examined the determinants of CEO compensation and firm 
performance of the Retailing Industry.  
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2. Hypotheses, data and methodology 
2.1. Hypotheses 
The question addressed by this paper is whether a significant relationship exists between CEO 
compensation and firm performance. It is hypothesized that CEO compensation should be 
positively related to firm performance.  
H0: There is no significant relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. 
H1: There is a significant relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance 
2.2 The data  
     The data for this study consists nine large U.S. General Merchandise chains that are publicly 
traded on major stock exchanges. We identify our general merchandise chains using the Fortune 
500 June 2016 issue along with Morning Star’s database. Our sample consists of annual data 
collected from 2010 to 2015.  Tables 1 lists the companies used in the study as well as their 
annual revenues for year ending 2015. 
Table I 
Name Revenue  
Wal-Mart Stores $482,130,000,000.00 
Target $73,785,000,000.00 
Macy’s $27,079,000,000.00 
Sears Holdings $25,146,000,000.00 
Dollar General $20,369,000,000.00 
Kohl’s $19,204,000,000.00 
Nordstrom $14,437,000,000.00 
J.C. Penney $12,625,000,000.00 
Dillard’s $6,755,000,000.00 
 
2.3 Methodology 
     Cross sectional and Stepwise regressions are performed on the dependent and independent 
variables in order to examine the relationship between CEO compensations and firm 
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performance. Previous studies that have examined the relationship between CEO compensation 
and firm performance have used both cross sectional and stepwise regressions performance 
(Agarwal, 1981; Jalbert, Jalbert, and Furumo, 2013). 
2.4 Proxies for the determinants of CEO Compensation 
The proxies used are as follows: 
Dependent Variable 
CEO Compensation (CEOCOMP): CEO compensation is measured as total salary, which 
includes grants of stock options, with the options, stock awards, non-equity incentive plan, 
change in pension value and non-qualified deferred compensation, all other compensation. 
 
Independent Variables 
  
1. Firm Size (SIZE):  Firm size is measured as the natural log of the market value of equity 
during our sampling period.  Firm size or market capitalization is defined as the price per 
share multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. Increasing the total market value 
should have a positive relationship with CEO pay. The sign of the coefficient is expected 
to be positive.  
2. Return on Equity (ROE): Return on equity is a proxy for profitability. This metric 
examines how shareholders were rewarded in the past year. It is hypothesized that the 
coefficient between CEO compensation and ROE is positive.  
3. Return on Assets (ROA): Return on assets is a proxy for how well the company is using 
assets to generate profits. It is hypothesized that the coefficient between CEO 
compensation and ROA is positive. 
4. Gross Margin % (GM): Gross margin is a proxy for how well the company is managing 
its gross profit to cover its selling and administrative costs. 
5. Total Sales (TS): Total sales are measured as the natural log of the annual revenue.  
6. Annual Stock Price Change (ASPC): The annual stock price change is measured as the 
percentage change for the year. The months range from February to January. Retail 
companies close their year-end January 31st. 
7. Earnings per share: Earnings per share is computed as Net Income divided by the number 
of shares outstanding. 
8. Financial Leverage: Financial leverage is defined as the amount of debt used in the 
capital structure of the firm. 
9. Market Capitalization:  Market capitalization is defined as the natural log of the number 
shares outstanding times the share price. 
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3. Empirical results 
Table II: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
CEO  13,121,152 9.52471E6 55 
ROA 7.1893 9.58428 55 
GM 32.2631 5.53054 55 
ROE 10.1571 65.76560 55 
Revenue 64,702,000,000 
1.31257E8 
55 
MCAP 35,638,000,000 6.47875E7 55 
EPS 1.3918 6.18437 55 
Stock 9.2322 31.39405 55 
Leverage 4.5702 9.17274 55 
 
Table 2 reports the means and standard deviation of the variables used in the cross section 
regression for the entire sample. The sample size includes 55 observations for each variable. 
There are a total of 495 observations. Not including revenue, market capitalization and CEO 
compensation, the highest mean belongs to GM (Gross Margin) at 32.26 while the lowest mean 
belongs to EPS at 1.39. Again, not including revenue, CEO compensation and market 
capitalization, the highest standard deviation belongs to ROE (Return on Equity) at 65.76 while 
the lowest standard deviation belongs to It is interesting note that the standard deviation for 
revenue is .489 but the standard deviation for annual stock price change is 31.394. This indicates 
that variability associated with annual stock price change is greater that the variability of the 
market index which is 20. 
Table III: ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.130 8 .266 3.232 .005a 
Residual 3.789 46 .082   
Total 5.919 54    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Leverage, Revenue, Stock, ROE, GM, EPS, ROA, MCAP 
b. Dependent Variable: CEO compensation 
 
Table IV: Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 3.984 .930  4.285 .000 
ROA .001 .008 .040 .167 .868 
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GM .016 .010 .270 1.678 .100 
ROE .000 .001 .024 .150 .881 
revenue1 .242 .239 .358 1.011 .317 
MCAP .101 .215 .174 .469 .641 
EPS .000 .010 .003 .016 .987 
Stock .002 .002 .166 1.121 .268 
Leverage -.009 .005 -.238 -1.746 .087 
a. Dependent Variable: Comp1 
 
Table 3 provides the results of the ANOVA. The ANOVA table shows a significant value of .005 
and we can reject the null hypothesis that the value of the regression coefficient = zero. Table 4 
shows the results of the cross sectional regression.   The cross sectional regression results 
indicate that none of the independent variables are significantly related to CEO compensation. 
Based on these results, we can reject the alternative hypothesis that there is a significant 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance.  Since our initial findings were 
not significant, we decided to perform a Stepwise regression. Other studies such as Jeppson, 
Smith and Stone (2009) and Jouber (2016) have used Stepwise regression to examine the 
relationship between CEO pay and firm performance. Table 5 depicts the model summary. In 
model 1, the R-square is .249, which indicates that 24.9% of the variability in CEO 
compensation is explained by the independent variables. Model 2 indicates that .305 or 30.5% of 
the variability in CEO compensation is explained by the independent variables.  The R square 
changed by .056 when the second variable, GM (Gross Margin) is entered into the model and is 
significant. Are results are similar to the results found by Nulla (2013) when examining the 
determinants of CEO pay in the Restaurant Industry.  
 
Table V: Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Chang
e 
1 .499a .249 .235 .28962 .249 17.561 1 53 .000 
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2 .552b .305 .278 .28127 .056 4.194 1 52 .046 
a. Predictors: (Constant), MCAP 
b. Predictors: (Constant), MCAP, GM
 
Table 6 provides the results of the Stepwise regression. Model 1 shows that MCAP (Market 
Capitalization) is significantly related and important for the determination of CEO compensation. 
The regression equation is CEO compensation = 4.940 + .289. This says that a unit increase in 
market capitalization will increase CEO compensation by .289. Model 2 shows that market 
capitalization and gross margin are significantly related to the level of CEO compensation and is 
an important determinant of CEO compensation. The regression is CEO compensation = 4.256 + 
.015. This says that a unit increase in gross margin will increase CEO compensation by .015.  
Table VI: Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 4.940 .494  9.992 .000 
MCAP .289 .069 .499 4.191 .000 
2 (Constant) 4.256 .585  7.279 .000 
MCAP .319 .069 .551 4.654 .000 
GM .015 .007 .242 2.048 .046 
a. Dependent Variable: CEO compensation 
 
4. Conclusion  
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationships between CEO compensation and firm 
level performance in the U.S. General Retail Store Sector. We performed cross sectional 
regressions on the entire sample and found no significant relationship existed between the level 
of CEO compensation and a set of independent variables that proxy for firm performance. We 
then performed a Stepwise regression and found that Market Capitalization and Gross Margin 
were significant related to the level of CEO compensation and a set of independent variables that 
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proxy firm performance. The implications from our findings suggest that CEO’s who increase 
market capitalization and improve gross margins may increase the level of compensation they 
receive. Further research should examine if these results are the same for other retail sectors. 
Also, the determinants of CEO compensation could include factors beyond those used in this 
study. 
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